If you were surfing web in US and visiting Europe web sites, then the ISP there may give out the traffic size to the adversaries in US, easier for them to do traffic measuring attack, is that what we TBB users should worry about and how to make them couldn’t correctly measure the traffic?
TBB does nothing to protect against correlation attacks. The network adds padding which could slightly help but the size of that padding is well known.
So the adversaries can detect how many sites you are visiting? And they can tell which internet frame belong to which site (unknown URL or IP address)??
Disclaimer: not a Tor expert, came up with the answer on the spot.
Being in an unfriendly country is not always enough to prevent a correlation attack. The requirement is that your connection to the entry Tor node is not monitored. So if the Tor node is in a “friendly” country and you are in an “unfriendly” one, the traffic can still be sniffed on the Tor relay’s side.
I heard that running a Tor relay on the same IP address you’re browsing the internet from should make traffic correlation harder because it’s hard to distinguish your browsing traffic from relay traffic.
Assuming they’re only monitoring your connection, not exit-relay-to-webiste connection? I don’t think so.
I’m not sure how that follows.