Tor@default.service has loop every 60 seconds. Journal -xe has write
The process’ exit code is ‘killed’ and its exit status is 9.
systemd[1]: tor@default.service: Failed with result ‘signal’.
systemd[1]: tor@default.service: Main process exited, code=killed, status=9/KILL
Get back to old torrc. Same problem
torcc is -
## Configuration file for a typical Tor user
## Last updated 9 October 2013 for Tor 0.2.5.2-alpha.
## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
##
## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
## by removing the "#" symbol.
##
## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
## for more options you can use in this file.
##
## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc
## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
#SocksPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
#SocksPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too.
## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept
## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who
## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections
## you make.
#SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16
#SocksPolicy reject *
## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
## you want.
##
## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
##
## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log
#Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
#Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log
## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
#Log notice syslog
## To send all messages to stderr:
#Log debug stderr
## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
#RunAsDaemon 1
## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
#DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
#ControlPort 9051
## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
#HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C
#CookieAuthentication 1
############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
## to tell people.
##
## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
## address y:z.
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
################ This section is just for relays #####################
#
## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details.
## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
#ORPort 9001
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
## yourself to make this work.
#ORPort 443 NoListen
#ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise
## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
#Address noname.example.com
## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
## outgoing traffic to use.
# OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5
## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
#Nickname ididnteditheconfig
## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
## be at least 20 KB.
## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits
## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, etc.
#RelayBandwidthRate 100 KB # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)
#RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps)
## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before
## hibernating.
##
## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
#AccountingMax 4 GB
## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
#AccountingStart day 00:00
## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
## is per month)
#AccountingStart month 3 15:00
## Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
## can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
## something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
## descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose.
#ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
#ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
## if you have enough bandwidth.
#DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
## forwarding yourself to make this work.
#DirPort 80 NoListen
#DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
## distribution for a sample.
#DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html
## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays
## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address.
#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...
## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_
## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an
## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the
## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
## described in the man page or at
## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html
##
## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
##
## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
## users will be told that those destinations are down.
##
## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
## networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry
## for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving".
##
#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more
#ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy
#ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed
## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
#BridgeRelay 1
## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run
## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
#PublishServerDescriptor 0
HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/site/
HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
``Apr 21 03:41:02.005 [notice] Tor 0.4.6.10 running on Linux with Libevent 2.1.11-stable, OpenSSL 1.1.1f, Zlib 1.2.11, Liblzma 5.2.4, Libzstd 1.4.4 and Glibc 2.31 as libc.
Apr 21 03:41:02.005 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://support.torproject.org/faq/staying-anonymous/
Apr 21 03:41:02.006 [notice] Read configuration file "/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc".
Apr 21 03:41:02.006 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".
Apr 21 03:41:02.080 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9050
Apr 21 03:41:02.082 [notice] Opened Socks listener connection (ready) on 127.0.0.1:9050
Apr 21 03:41:02.000 [warn] Your log may contain sensitive information - you're logging more than "notice". Don't log unless it serves an important reason. Overwrite the log afterwards.
Apr 21 03:41:02.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /usr/share/tor/geoip.
Apr 21 03:41:02.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file /usr/share/tor/geoip6.
Apr 21 03:41:03.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0% (starting): Starting
Apr 21 03:41:05.000 [notice] Starting with guard context "default"
Apr 21 03:41:05.000 [notice] Signaled readiness to systemd
Apr 21 03:41:06.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 5% (conn): Connecting to a relay
Apr 21 03:41:06.000 [notice] Opening Socks listener on /run/tor/socks
Apr 21 03:41:06.000 [notice] Opened Socks listener connection (ready) on /run/tor/socks
Apr 21 03:41:06.000 [notice] Opening Control listener on /run/tor/control
Apr 21 03:41:06.000 [notice] Opened Control listener connection (ready) on /run/tor/control
Apr 21 03:41:07.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 10% (conn_done): Connected to a relay
Apr 21 03:41:07.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 14% (handshake): Handshaking with a relay
Apr 21 03:41:07.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 15% (handshake_done): Handshake with a relay done
Apr 21 03:41:07.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 75% (enough_dirinfo): Loaded enough directory info to build circuits
Apr 21 03:41:07.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 90% (ap_handshake_done): Handshake finished with a relay to build circuits
Apr 21 03:41:07.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 95% (circuit_create): Establishing a Tor circuit
Apr 21 03:41:07.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 100% (done): Done
Apr 21 03:42:01.000 [notice] Tor 0.4.6.10 opening log file.
Apr 21 03:42:01.678 [notice] We compiled with OpenSSL 1010106f: OpenSSL 1.1.1f 31 Mar 2020 and we are running with OpenSSL 1010106f: 1.1.1f. These two versions should be binary compatible.
Apr 21 03:42:01.680 [notice] Tor 0.4.6.10 running on Linux with Libevent 2.1.11-stable, OpenSSL 1.1.1f, Zlib 1.2.11, Liblzma 5.2.4, Libzstd 1.4.4 and Glibc 2.31 as libc.
Apr 21 03:42:01.681 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://support.torproject.org/faq/staying-anonymous/
Apr 21 03:42:01.682 [notice] Read configuration file "/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc".
Apr 21 03:42:01.682 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".
Apr 21 03:42:01.687 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9050
Apr 21 03:42:01.687 [notice] Opened Socks listener connection (ready) on 127.0.0.1:9050
Apr 21 03:42:01.000 [warn] Your log may contain sensitive information - you're logging more than "notice". Don't log unless it serves an important reason. Overwrite the log afterwards.
Apr 21 03:42:01.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /usr/share/tor/geoip.
Apr 21 03:42:02.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file /usr/share/tor/geoip6.
Apr 21 03:42:03.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0% (starting): Starting
Apr 21 03:42:06.000 [notice] Starting with guard context "default"
Apr 21 03:42:06.000 [notice] Signaled readiness to systemd
Apr 21 03:42:07.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 5% (conn): Connecting to a relay
Apr 21 03:42:07.000 [notice] Opening Socks listener on /run/tor/socks
Apr 21 03:42:07.000 [notice] Opened Socks listener connection (ready) on /run/tor/socks
Apr 21 03:42:07.000 [notice] Opening Control listener on /run/tor/control
Apr 21 03:42:07.000 [notice] Opened Control listener connection (ready) on /run/tor/control
Apr 21 03:42:07.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 10% (conn_done): Connected to a relay
Apr 21 03:42:07.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 14% (handshake): Handshaking with a relay
Apr 21 03:42:07.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 15% (handshake_done): Handshake with a relay done
Apr 21 03:42:07.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 75% (enough_dirinfo): Loaded enough directory info to build circuits
Apr 21 03:42:07.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 90% (ap_handshake_done): Handshake finished with a relay to build circuits
Apr 21 03:42:07.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 95% (circuit_create): Establishing a Tor circuit
Apr 21 03:42:08.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 100% (done): Done``
Add debug log
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [info] circuit_predict_and_launch_new(): Have 4 clean circs (2 internal), need another internal circ for my hidden service.
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [info] origin_circuit_new(): Circuit 5 chose an idle timeout of 2762 based on 2673 seconds of predictive building remaining.
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] new_route_len(): Chosen route length 3 (6863 direct and 6863 indirect routers suitable).
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] router_choose_random_node_helper(): We found 5742 running nodes.
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] compute_weighted_bandwidths(): Generated weighted bandwidths for rule weight as middle node based on weights Wg=0.401800 Wm=1.000000 We=0.000000 Wd=0.000000 with total bw 29527278802.000000
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] extend_info_from_node(): using 188.68.41.119:9001 for minestrone
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [info] extend_info_from_node(): Including Ed25519 ID for $B8805CBDBE91A5E68D268FC62DC617B5BD7CC9E7~minestrone [1FJ7myszIaZvAB6S2/2Y/VvHKR/gf9Fb97SQ97ekl/g] at 188.68.41.119 and [2a03:4000:17:80f:5461:1fff:fe7c:9b93]
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] onion_extend_cpath(): Path is 0 long; we want 3
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [info] select_primary_guard_for_circuit(): Selected primary guard Unnamed ($7172DCA431DEBC88ADFE2203EA341C3BF33DD2CB) for circuit from a list size of 1.
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] extend_info_from_node(): using 3.68.246.154:80 for Unnamed
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [info] extend_info_from_node(): Including Ed25519 ID for $7172DCA431DEBC88ADFE2203EA341C3BF33DD2CB~Unnamed [hX8e5OP/z5VNaZXqFrqzqlcyl2AYdUuMUDki8UMkMw0] at 3.68.246.154
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] onion_extend_cpath(): Chose router $7172DCA431DEBC88ADFE2203EA341C3BF33DD2CB~Unnamed [hX8e5OP/z5VNaZXqFrqzqlcyl2AYdUuMUDki8UMkMw0] at 3.68.246.154 for hop #1 (exit is minestrone)
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] onion_extend_cpath(): Path is 1 long; we want 3
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] choose_good_middle_server(): Contemplating intermediate hop #2: random choice.
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] router_choose_random_node_helper(): We found 5742 running nodes.
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] compute_weighted_bandwidths(): Generated weighted bandwidths for rule weight as middle node based on weights Wg=0.401800 Wm=1.000000 We=0.000000 Wd=0.000000 with total bw 28063609082.000000
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] extend_info_from_node(): using 94.130.181.104:9001 for ajourmag
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [info] extend_info_from_node(): Including Ed25519 ID for $D05F41CB78A00311D8EC4ABB4E951582E8298D0C~ajourmag [FpUb6eBcj5IcYl9qAR0E14uyQTC2H7qv4EgkjR1oSL8] at 94.130.181.104 and [2a01:4f8:1c0c:4162::1]
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] onion_extend_cpath(): Chose router $D05F41CB78A00311D8EC4ABB4E951582E8298D0C~ajourmag [FpUb6eBcj5IcYl9qAR0E14uyQTC2H7qv4EgkjR1oSL8] at 94.130.181.104 for hop #2 (exit is minestrone)
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] onion_extend_cpath(): Path is 2 long; we want 3
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] onion_extend_cpath(): Chose router $B8805CBDBE91A5E68D268FC62DC617B5BD7CC9E7~minestrone [1FJ7myszIaZvAB6S2/2Y/VvHKR/gf9Fb97SQ97ekl/g] at 188.68.41.119 for hop #3 (exit is minestrone)
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] onion_extend_cpath(): Path is complete: 3 steps long
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] dispatch_send_msg_unchecked(): Queued: ocirc_cevent (<gid=5 evtype=0 reason=0 onehop=0>) from or, on ocirc.
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] dispatcher_run_msg_cbs(): Delivering: ocirc_cevent (<gid=5 evtype=0 reason=0 onehop=0>) from or, on ocirc:
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] dispatcher_run_msg_cbs(): Delivering to btrack.
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] btc_cevent_rcvr(): CIRC gid=5 evtype=0 reason=0 onehop=0
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [info] circuit_handle_first_hop(): Next router is [scrubbed]: Connection in progress; waiting.
Apr 21 03:43:11.000 [debug] circuit_handle_first_hop(): connecting in progress (or finished). Good.
Apr 21 03:43:12.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:13.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:14.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:15.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:16.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:17.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:18.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:19.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:20.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:21.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:22.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:23.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:24.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:25.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:26.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:27.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:28.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:29.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:30.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:31.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:32.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Apr 21 03:43:33.000 [debug] circuit_remove_handled_ports(): Port 443 is already being handled; removing.
Please don’t ask the same question in multiple channels.
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