There is a kind of attack called Website traffic fingerprinting, where an ISP/government/hacker observes a user’s encrypted data traffic, and uses traffic timing and quantity of data transfered to guess what website that user is visiting, and thus collect logs of websites a user browsed and also know if they are using tor.
(Infos: New low cost traffic analysis attacks and mitigations | The Tor Project )
Luckily, Tor can resist MOST of these attacks thanks to the complicated network patterns created by Tor nodes around the world.
Practical website traffic fingerprinting attacks against the live Tor network have been limited by the sheer quantity and variety of all kinds (and combinations) of traffic that the Tor network carries.
However, this leads me to a question:
Tor can resist these attacks because of the huge number of nodes (about 6000)，yet there are only about 2000 bridges, which is quite few compared with the number of nodes.
(Infos: Servers – Tor Metrics )
I suspect that using bridges to connect to Tor makes less-complicated network patterns and decreases the variety of traffic patterns.
Does using bridges to connect to Tor make me less secured, increase the chance of exposing me into Website traffic fingerprinting and make my ISP know the fact that I am using Tor?